What the department argued, what taxpayers argued and how the Bench reacted — case by case, merged across every hearing day — with the legal propositions that emerge, consolidated and free of repetition.
Latest update — hearings of 4–5 November 2026. 3 new cases, 2 updated and 17 new propositions — on suppliers’ registrations cancelled later, classification of organic fertilisers and laboratory evidence, notices issued only as a DRC-01 summary, section 74 grounds and review authorisations.
Every proposition that emerged from the hearings, merged where the same point arose more than once. Each card says whether it is an order of the Tribunal, an observation from the Bench, or a point argued on which the order is awaited — and links to the case it came from.
No proposition matches. Try another word, or clear the filters.
The show cause notice11
01Bench
The show cause notice is the outer boundary of the case.
Both the allegation and its basis must appear in the notice. The department cannot formulate the basis afterwards, supply it through an enquiry during the appeal or by rejoinder, or shift from one allegation to another. A taxpayer at least gets an opportunity after the notice; for the department the notice is a complete block. Facts first mentioned in the order-in-original or order-in-appeal — a survey, an investigation — cannot sustain the demand (s. 75(7)).
The department cannot add allegations at the Tribunal — even true ones.
If the notice does not allege that goods were not received, that cannot be argued now: “Don’t invent it freshly, as if it was discovered today.” The burden under section 155 operates at the investigation and notice stage; once the notice identifies the discrepancies, the matter is confined to them.
“Non-existent” is a conclusion; the notice must state what was found.
What was observed on the visit, on which date — premises present or absent, locked or occupied, who was met and what he said. A letter from another Commissionerate that a party “does not exist” is a bare conclusion. The verification report must exist, form part of the notice and be producible.
Absence on the day of a visit — years later — is not proof of non-existence.
“If I send somebody to your house today and you are not there, does it mean you do not exist?” Nor can the standard be escalated against the taxpayer — first a photograph of the open shop, then a person inside it.
Non-existence, non-receipt and non-payment are separate allegations, each needing its own proof.
Authority on a supplier’s non-payment does not apply where the allegation is non-existence, and the department cannot move between the two: “There has to be an allegation that tax has not been paid.” Where the notice runs non-receipt and non-payment as alternatives, establishing one does not establish the other.
A third-party statement must show who made it, and how he knows.
Who recorded it, when, in which enquiry, and what connection the maker had with the supplier or the transaction. “If a passer-by says someone is bogus, the first questions are who he is and how he knows.” A statement not supplied to the noticee cannot be relied on.
Listing a document among the relied-upon documents is not relying on it in the notice.
A statement listed in the RUDs but never discussed in the notice, or made the basis of the allegation, cannot become the foundation of a departmental appeal. The Bench also tested the department against its own conduct: why was no tax demanded on the very sale the statement records?
A notice to cancel registration that says only “in case registration has been obtained by fraud” is not a proper notice of cancellation, and is no material against the recipient.
A wrong heading in the notice is cured only if the adjudicating authority recognised it.
Where the authority classified under the heading in the notice while giving reasons for another, reliance on section 160 and on the principle that a wrong label does not vitiate a power is open to doubt.
The department must produce the material behind its notice, not just its conclusions.
Field reports, statements and records from other formations relied on in the notice must be placed on record, together with what became of the notices to the suppliers.
A GSTR-2A mismatch for periods before 1 January 2022 is not a ground to deny credit.
Section 16(2)(aa) came into force only on 1 January 2022 — its very insertion shows the condition did not exist earlier. For FY 2017-18 to 2019-20, non-reflection in GSTR-2A was a clue to investigate, not a statutory bar; and a gross comparison is not an identification of wrongly availed credit.
The annual return cannot generate a credit demand.
Credit is “taken” only when it reaches the electronic credit ledger through GSTR-3B; GSTR-9 posts nothing and GSTR-9C is a reconciliation. Since Table 8A auto-populates from GSTR-2A, a Table 8 demand alongside a 3B–2A demand is the same demand raised twice.
Section 16(2)(c) needs investigation, not inference.
Before invoking it, the department must identify the invoices and the supplier and make at least a preliminary enquiry into whether the tax was paid — before the notice. It cannot reason backwards from a GSTR-2A mismatch to non-payment. Section 155 places the burden on the claimant but does not relieve the department of its duty to enquire.
Recovery from the supplier satisfies section 16(2)(c) — the department cannot recover from both.
“Once the supplier pays, where is the question of denying credit?” Maruti Enterprises does not authorise double recovery. The department’s own record against the supplier bears on the recipient: periods missing from the supplier’s notice indicate the supplier paid for them.
Credit is provisional when taken — the recipient cannot know whether the supplier paid.
“Otherwise what is the point of provisional credit?” Special knowledge of non-payment rests with the department and the supplier — the department knows first, when GSTR-1 is filed and GSTR-3B is not — not with the recipient.
No machinery, no denial: before 2022 there was no lawful route to deny credit directly for supplier default.
Section 16(2)(c) has been subject to section 41 since 2017. The matching and interim-denial machinery (sections 42, 43, 43A) never came into force, and the reversal machinery of section 41(2) and Rule 37A arrived only in 2022; Maruti Enterprises upheld validity because of section 41(2). The GST Council (27th meeting) had resolved: no automatic reversal from the buyer; recover from the seller first.
The demand must be pruned to the department’s own documents.
Credit already reversed, credit never availed, and tax shown by the department’s own material to have been paid by the supplier cannot remain in the demand on the recipient, whatever view is taken of the law.
Later cancellation of the supplier’s registration does not, by itself, defeat the recipient’s credit.
Section 16(2) asks four things — invoice, receipt, tax paid, return. If none is shown to fail, cancellation, even for fraud, is no ground. Fraud is judged transaction by transaction: “A person confirmed under section 74 once is not a fraud for life.” A supplier that later closed its business on its own application does not make its earlier sales bogus. (On 22.10.2026 an appeal where credit was disallowed in connection with retrospective cancellation of registration was allowed.)
Once basic proof of receipt is produced, the department must enquire.
Invoice, e-way bill, vehicle details, weighbridge slip and bank payment shift the matter to the department; without enquiry of the transporter or vehicle owner, non-receipt remains unproved. Circumstances such as avoiding a toll road, dealing through brokers (“In steel and scrap business there are everywhere brokers”) or asking to pay in instalments are not, by themselves, proof of a fictitious purchase.
Returned goods are received goods — credit on the buyer’s debit note is a procedural lapse if there is no double credit.
“I sell you something, you can sell it back to me.” Where the supplier took re-credit on returned goods through the buyer’s debit note instead of a section 34 credit note, the questions are whether the goods came back and whether the buyer did not take the same credit; a CA certificate answering them reduces the objection to one of procedure.
A credit note does not automatically require reversal of credit.
Under section 15(3) a post-supply discount without a prior agreement does not reduce the value at all; where there is an agreement, the supplier’s liability falls only if the recipient reverses — and that choice is the recipient’s.
No payment payable, no 180-day reversal — and business nexus is a different objection.
The second proviso to section 16(2) presupposes a consideration to be paid; Rule 37 deems supplies between related or distinct persons under Schedule I to have been paid. If a supply is not for business, credit fails under section 16(1) whether or not it was paid for — and that must be alleged in the notice; it cannot be raised in appeal where the only ground was the 180 days.
Reversal under Rule 42 is tested at the stage of supply.
Even an inevitable by-product, once supplied as an exempt supply, raises the reversal question; the intention behind producing it is not the test (MK Agro Tech applied by analogy). The taxpayer’s answer — inputs wholly used for the taxable product, “used” rather than “relatable” — is yet to be decided.
Conditions of one transitional provision cannot be imported into another.
If TRAN-1 credit was taken under section 140(6), the section 140(1) return condition does not apply: “Where is it written that if returns are not filed, credit will not be given?” The department must first establish the sub-section on facts, then a ground in its notice.
“ITC is a concession” is accepted — but it decides nothing by itself.
The proposition that credit is a statutory concession and not a vested right was accepted without demur; it does not answer whether the conditions were in fact met or properly alleged.
Section 74 requires an election and then a purpose.
The department must say which of fraud, wilful misstatement or suppression it alleges, and then show the act was done to evade tax — a requirement governing all three limbs. Wrongdoing unconnected with tax is irrelevant: “Suppose I defraud my customer — that is irrelevant.” “Wilful” attaches only to misstatement.
What the department learns on verification is not suppression by the taxpayer.
“If the department doesn’t verify, it doesn’t know.” A fact surfacing in DGGI or audit verification does not, without more, show suppression; data readily available in the department’s own system cannot be suppressed — “Where is suppression?” — and facts known to both sides are not suppressed.
Where the credit is eligible, there can be no intent to avail ineligible credit.
Reversal for non-payment within 180 days suspends the credit; it does not make it ineligible, and payment restores it. Attributing the intent to evade that section 74 needs is therefore very difficult.
Two limbs only: non-declaration of what the law requires to be declared in a return or statement, and failure to furnish information asked for in writing. It is not imported from earlier legislation, and “collusion” in the excise provision is absent from GST.
A genuine, general dispute on the levy — later decided against the department — rules out section 74 penalty.
Where penalty was proposed on leasehold assignment, section 74 was held not invokable. Payment made after investigation began but before the notice does not by itself supply the mental element.
It tells the proper officer what he may do where section 74 fails; it does not require or authorise a remand direction from the Tribunal — and the department cannot make a new case under section 73 by rejoinder (GR Infra Projects).
Credit cannot be denied inside a refund proceeding.
Without a notice under section 73 or 74, the credit stays in the ledger and can pay tax; it cannot be treated as ineligible only to compute “Net ITC” under Rule 89(4). Described from the Bench as “quite well settled” (GSTAT Ernakulam, 2026).
A refund rejection must rest on the refund notice and give reasons.
Where the notice raised only documentary points and stated nil as inadmissible, an unexplained deduction cannot stand: “How do we find out whether you are right or wrong unless you give the reason?”
The ledger debit on filing a claim is a temporary condition of the application, made permanent only if the refund is allowed. Re-credit is a legal consequence, not an officer’s prerogative; a demand of erroneous refund is not a demand of tax.
No interest for the period tax lies in the Electronic Cash Ledger.
Interest under section 50 is compensatory, and that operates against the revenue: “It is like a savings account… It does not work in reverse.” Following the jurisdictional High Court (Symphony Ltd.), an amount credited to the cash ledger is paid on the date of credit; the Tribunal will not depart from that because other High Courts differ. Order pronounced 22.10.2026.
Judicial decisions are retrospective unless the Supreme Court expressly says otherwise.
Prospective overruling is a special power exercised only by express declaration; Mohit Minerals contains none. A notification declared unconstitutional is void from its issue.
Refund on export of a brand — inputs of the business may be the nexus.
Put to the department: a brand has value only because the business is conducted, so the inputs and services of the business contribute to it — a possible answer to the “used in making” requirement of Rule 89(4).
Tax paid on a transaction that is not a supply is refundable.
An appellate order allowing refund of GST paid on assignment of leasehold rights was left undisturbed. (Whether the section 54 time limit applies to such refunds remains to be argued in a later case.)
Assignment of leasehold rights in an industrial plot is not a taxable supply.
It is a transfer of benefits arising out of immovable property (Gujarat Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Gujarat HC; SLPs dismissed by the Supreme Court). Departmental appeals are dismissed; a proposed review petition is no answer, and a plea for “verification” fails where the notice itself presupposes verification.
Before 1 January 2022, section 129 had no penalty equal to the value of the goods.
It provided 100% of tax (owner coming forward) or 50% of value (owner not coming forward); a penalty equal to value belongs to section 130, which must be invoked.
Rule 138C binds the officer as strictly as Rule 138 binds the taxpayer.
“As compulsory as generating Part B is, so compulsory is following Rule 138C.” EWB-03 inspection reports — summary within 24 hours, final within three days — must be shown to have been generated.
MOV-09 or DRC-07 — which is the order under section 129?
Relying on Panchhi Traders (Gujarat HC), MOV-09 has no statutory backing and DRC-07 is the order; a DRC-07 issued beyond seven days breaches section 129(3), and intent to evade must be concluded and recorded first. The Bench noted that differing MOV-09 and DRC-07 amounts complicate the question.
The department must assist on precedent, not merely restate the section.
The Bench will apply binding judgments whether or not they are cited — “Even if you don’t say, I will have to apply those” — and the department must show why they do or do not apply.
A person who disclaims seized goods cannot be made their owner.
Where the noticee disclaims ownership during investigation and the claimants prove it, there is no title dispute; the Tribunal will not create one, and the person who disclaimed cannot be made to bear the tax. The department may proceed against the true owners.
Confiscation needs the goods or the bond of the person concerned.
Goods can be confiscated only if held, or released under a bond that is then enforced; one person’s bond cannot be enforced against another. Once goods are released on bond and security, an appeal against release is infructuous — and such an appeal is confined to release, not tax, title or confiscation.
Admissibility and reliability of seized electronic data are different questions.
That buyers were not investigated, and that seized data is unreliable, are separate challenges needing separate reasons. A section 65B certificate may come later and from the responsible officer, with the chain of custody stated (Arjun Panditrao Khotkar); corroboration — arithmetic accuracy, matching challans and cash books, unretracted statements — carries the data.
A chemical used to treat an animal or vegetable fertiliser need not itself be organic.
Heading 3101 covers such fertilisers “whether or not mixed together or chemically treated”; the treating chemical is an outside substance and its presence does not take the product out of 3101.
“Essential constituent” is not a test of percentage alone.
Under Note 6 to Chapter 31 it may depend on the product’s object and function — if removing the element makes the product useless, it is essential; who buys it, for what, and how it is advertised may be relevant. (Tentative; to be argued further.)
“Not reported” is not “negative” in a laboratory report.
Proved, disproved and not proved are three different things. A laboratory’s silence on an element does not establish its absence — though a laboratory asked for “essential constituents” that reports one only in some samples may show how it understood the request.
Laboratory accreditation is tested for the date of the test.
What matters is accreditation covering the laboratory and the test when it was done, not the period in dispute. Whether a sample drawn years later represents the goods cleared is a separate objection.
A departmental appeal is bounded by the review authorisation.
The reviewing Commissioner determines the questions and authorises the appeal; the officer cannot add grounds or enlarge the claim. To raise more, the department needs a fresh authorisation and an application to the Tribunal.
Departmental appeals below the monetary limit are not maintainable.
Below Rs. 20 lakh under Circular 207/1/2024-GST, and outside its exclusions, the appeal is dismissed with the questions left open. The carve-out for questions of law needs real substance — “Let us not fight for Rs. 20,000” — and the Tribunal may raise maintainability on its own.
The first appellate authority must uphold the truth, not the notice.
“The appellate authority has to uphold the truth, on the evidence before it.” That its order goes against the notice, or makes the adjudicating authority’s task harder, is not a ground; the department must show an error in the order.
A defect in the appellate authority’s record is not visited on the taxpayer.
Rule 112 entitles the department to examine evidence admitted in appeal, but the authority’s failure to annex or circulate a document is no ground to deny credit; a department that did not appear below cannot complain of want of opportunity. Keep objections separate — “A in A, B in B.”
A circular binds the department, even where it does not bind the court.
A beneficial circular must be applied by the department; it cannot be discarded because circulars do not bind quasi-judicial authorities. Objections must go to specific non-compliance with its conditions — such as a missing UDIN — not to its applicability.
Tax cannot be imposed by intendment; the department must bring the subject within the charging provision. The rule is not one of strictness against the taxpayer, and it operates in the field of levy rather than credit.
Where the ledger held many times the amount throughout and the debit followed months later, inadvertence rather than design is a reasonable inference. Open questions: is purpose irrelevant to a statutory requirement, and must the deposit be made on the very day of filing? GST says no appeal “shall be filed”; Central Excise said the Tribunal “shall not entertain”.
The section 128A waiver is for the proper officer, through Rule 164.
The benefit is claimed in SPL-01/SPL-02 and decided by the proper officer after scrutiny; whether a first appellate authority can grant it directly is a question of jurisdiction now reserved.
A “cross-objection” that challenges nothing is a reply.
Substance governs the label. A cross-objection under section 112(5) is for challenging part of the appellate order; a filing that only opposes the other side’s appeal is treated as a reply and uploaded against the numbered appeal.
New material at the Tribunal is tested against the record.
Factual material raised for the first time without an application for leave may be resisted; product-wise details not before the lower authorities may be new evidence; a plea never taken earlier carries little weight.
Knowledge of a document defeats a plea of non-supply.
Where the document is referred to in statements the party received and signed, knowledge is established; a party that did not get a document is expected to ask for it at the outset.
Legal argument is one thing; a factual assertion contradicted by the paper book damages trust. The Bench relies on what counsel say and will call for the lower authorities’ records where a factual dispute is genuinely raised.
Each case as it stands on 5 November 2026: the department’s case, the taxpayer’s case and the Bench’s reaction, merged across all hearings. Pick a case from the index, or turn the pages with the arrows, your keyboard or a swipe.
01 / 24
Case 01 of 24Order reserved on 29.09.2026
Sales returns booked through the buyers’ debit notes — GSTR-3B v. GSTR-2A and a Table 8 demand
Appeal by
Department
Period
FY 2017-18
Heard on
18.08, 08.09, 29.09 (2026)
Provisions
s. 16(2)(aa), 16(2)(c), 34, 15(3), 155; Rule 112; Circular 183/15/2022-GST
The matter. Demand under section 73 on (i) the excess of credit in GSTR-3B over GSTR-2A and (ii) Table 8D of the annual return. Goods sold by the taxpayer were rejected and returned; instead of issuing credit notes under section 34 and reducing output tax, it took credit on the buyers’ debit notes, which the buyers never reported, so they did not appear in its GSTR-2A. The buyers certified they took no credit. The first appellate authority admitted CA certificates and dropped both demands, relying on Circular 183 and revenue neutrality.
Department’s case
The CA certificate carries no UDIN, as para 4.1 of Circular 183 requires; one certificate is undated.
The certificates are fresh evidence admitted in appeal without a line of reasons and without giving the department an opportunity — a breach of Rule 112 (Andaman Timber; Iqbal Ahmed — additional evidence is not to patch up a weak case).
Circular 183 is case-specific and confined to bona fide errors of a recipient; here the taxpayer is the supplier, and none of the three scenarios in the circular fits. Circulars do not bind quasi-judicial authorities in any case.
Section 34 is the only route for returns: a credit note, reported in GSTR-1, reducing output tax. A thing prescribed to be done in a particular manner must be done in that manner (Ambay Cements; Dilip Kumar & Co.).
No transport documents prove the goods came back; under section 155 the burden is on the claimant (Ecom Gill Coffee Trading).
Section 16(2)(c) has been upheld by the High Court and the Supreme Court; under the unamended section 41 pre-2022 credit was provisional; ITC is a concession, not a right; taxing statutes are strictly construed.
Taxpayer’s case
The difference is sales returns against identified invoices; credit was increased instead of output tax being reduced — the effect is the same and the exercise is revenue neutral.
Bills, sales-return invoices, debit and credit notes, ledgers, customer declarations of no credit, and a CA certificate are on record; the defence reply before the adjudicating authority enclosed them.
Circular 183 was issued for exactly this period and allows certificates to be produced during proceedings.
The Gujarat High Court, in the inverse case, held that an order resting only on the 3B–2A difference that brushes aside the explanation leads to double taxation, and remanded it.
Revenue neutrality: CCE v. Coca Cola India (SC).
From the Bench
Credit is taken only when it reaches the electronic credit ledger through GSTR-3B. GSTR-9 posts nothing to the ledger and GSTR-9C is a reconciliation; Table 8A itself auto-populates from GSTR-2A — so the Table 8 demand is the same demand raised twice.
Section 16(2)(aa) — appearance in GSTR-2A — came in only from 1 January 2022. The departmental representative accepted that no law required it in FY 2017-18. Non-appearance was a clue to investigate, not a bar on credit.
Section 16(2)(c) requires investigation, not inference: identify the invoices and the supplier and make a preliminary enquiry into payment, before the notice. Section 155 does not displace the department’s duty to investigate.
The matching scheme of the unamended section 41 was never operational, so a “provisional credit” argument cannot be built on it.
A circular may not bind the court, but it binds the department, and the court will hold the department to it. Objections must go to specific non-compliance (the UDIN point was recorded), not to the circular’s applicability.
Strict construction means tax cannot be levied by intendment; it operates against the revenue in the field of levy, not against the taxpayer’s credit.
Not every credit note requires reversal (section 15(3)). Returned goods are received goods: I sell you something, you can sell it back to me. If the taxpayer took re-credit and the buyer did not take the same credit, the case can be closed — that is why the CA certificate matters; the objection is really one of procedure.
The notice never alleged that the goods were not received: Don’t invent it freshly, as if it was discovered today. Even if the goods had been a blocked item, an allegation not in the notice cannot be taken up now.
Nobody appeared for the department before the first appellate authority; it cannot fault that authority for want of opportunity. Rule 112 reasons and non-supply are separate objections — A in A, B in B.
When the department disputed that the certificates were filed below, the Bench found them listed and placed in the paper book: on facts, counsel must be accurate.
The question is not section 73 or 74, but whether the basic credit can be availed on these facts.
Supplier did not pay the tax — section 16(2)(c) and section 74 against the recipient
Appeal by
Department (taxpayer’s cross-appeal on s. 74 taken on record)
Period
FY 2018-19 and 2019-20
Heard on
08.09, 22.09 (2026)
Provisions
s. 16(2)(c), 41, 42, 43, 43A, 74, 75(2), 155; Evidence Act s. 106
The matter. Credit denied under section 74 because the supplier did not pay the tax collected. The first appellate authority found the goods received, paid for and genuine. For the same supplies the supplier was proceeded against only under section 73, by a notice issued months after the recipient’s case was adjudicated; that demand is confirmed and recovery is pending. The invoices appeared in the recipient’s GSTR-2A.
Department’s case
Section 16(2)(c) is mandatory: where the supplier does not pay, the recipient gets no credit (Maruti Enterprises, Gujarat HC, affirmed in Bhandari Scrap Traders, SC); ITC is a concession and every condition must be met (ALD Automotive).
Credit reaches the ledger only through GSTR-3B, where the respondent misreported Table 4(A)(5).
The recipient knew of the non-payment, as its own later letter shows — special knowledge under section 106 of the Evidence Act — while the department learnt of it only on DGGI and departmental verification; hence section 74.
In rejoinders: treat the case as one under section 73 and remand it under section 75(2).
Taxpayer’s case
Section 74 rests here only on “wrongful availment”. Section 16(2)(c) has been expressly subject to section 41 since 2017; supplier default does not by itself make the recipient’s availment wrongful.
Maruti and Bhandari decided only constitutional validity, upheld because section 41(2) allows re-credit — and that, with Rule 37A, came only in 2022. For 2018–20 the matching and interim-denial machinery (sections 42, 43, 43A) was never in force: no machinery, no lawful route to deny credit directly.
The GST Council (27th meeting, 4 May 2018) resolved: no automatic reversal from the buyer; recover from the seller first; reverse from the buyer only for a missing dealer, closure or inadequate assets.
Special knowledge is knowledge the other side lacks. The department knows of the supply when GSTR-1 is filed and is the first to know of non-payment when GSTR-3B is not.
On the department’s own documents, some demanded months are not in the supplier’s notice at all — so the supplier paid for them; credit already reversed, never availed, or deposited by the supplier cannot remain in the demand.
No new case by rejoinder (GR Infra Projects, SC); section 75(2) tells the proper officer what he may do — it is not a remand provision for the Tribunal.
From the Bench
Once tax is recovered from the supplier, section 16(2)(c) stands complied with: Once the supplier pays, where is the question of denying credit? The department cannot recover from both; Maruti Enterprises does not say otherwise.
The supplier’s notice and order were directed to be placed on record; if that notice does not cover a period, the department is not even alleging non-payment for it.
Credit is provisional when taken — the recipient has no way of knowing whether the supplier paid: Otherwise what is the point of provisional credit?
If the department doesn’t verify, it doesn’t know. That is not something done by the taxpayer; a fact surfacing in DGGI verification is not suppression under section 74. If the department knew first, what was suppressed, and from whom?
The credit was wholly reflected in GSTR-2A; the department’s mid-argument suggestion to the contrary was rejected.
Supplier alleged to be non-existent — a spot visit three years after the supply
Appeal by
Taxpayer
Period
FY 2018-19
Heard on
01.09 (2026)
Provisions
s. 16(2), 155
The matter. Credit denied on the footing that the supplier was non-existent and issued paper invoices. The only basis was a spot visit with panchnama about three years after the supplies, after the pandemic. The first appellate authority decided against the taxpayer but recorded that the supplier was carrying on business at the time; the department did not appeal that finding. The fabric was embroidered and sold to a merchant exporter whose shipping bills carry the taxpayer’s name.
Department’s case
The notice, read as a whole, makes the ground clear; not citing a sub-clause does not vitiate it.
Three opportunities were given below; there was no prejudice.
Burden under section 155; invoices, bank payments and GSTR-2A do not prove receipt (Supreme Court on ITC under a State VAT law). No transport documents at all; an industry practice of small consignments without e-way bills cannot override the statute.
The spot verification establishes non-existence (the report itself could not be produced). Late in argument: the supplier had not paid tax through GSTR-3B.
Taxpayer’s case
The notice is vague — no clause, no inspection details.
Cancellation of the supplier’s registration for his own defaults has no bearing on these purchases; photographs show the premises exist; the visit was three years later, after the pandemic.
Complete trail: invoices, payments, GSTR-2A, the merchant exporter’s shipping bills. The first appellate authority’s finding that the supplier was in business is final.
The same tax appears to have been demanded from the supplier, the taxpayer and the taxpayer’s own supplier.
From the Bench
Two questions — what is the allegation, and what is its basis — and neither could be answered from the notice. We cannot formulate the basis now. We cannot dig it out by making an enquiry today.
The asymmetry: a taxpayer at least gets an opportunity after the notice; for the department, the notice is a complete block.
If I send somebody to your house today and you are not there, does it mean you do not exist? The reasoning — a returned letter, a locked door on a stated day — must be in the notice. Nor can the standard be raised step by step against the taxpayer.
The unchallenged finding that the supplier was in business is final.
The department’s authority concerns non-payment of tax; its allegation is non-existence. There has to be an allegation that tax has not been paid. If there is no allegation, we will not examine that question. A registration granted and later cancelled sits awkwardly with “never existed”.
That ITC is a concession was accepted, but it does not decide the case.
Four suppliers and their transporters alleged non-existent — toll data, brokers and an instalment letter
Appeal by
Department
Period
FY 2018-19
Heard on
08.09 (2026)
Provisions
s. 16(2)(b), 16(2)(c), 74, 155
The matter. A scrap and steel trader’s credit on four suppliers was denied under section 74: suppliers said to be non-existent, goods not received and tax not paid (the suppliers discharged GSTR-3B through their own credit). The first appellate authority found the goods received, giving benefit of doubt on the route. The taxpayer had itself reversed part of the credit.
Department’s case
Alert circulars from another Commissionerate found the suppliers non-existent; summons to transporters returned undelivered and they too were not found.
The trucks shown did not cross a toll plaza on the direct route; the alternative route is longer and costlier.
The proprietor dealt only through agents, never visited the suppliers and had no agents’ contacts; his later request to pay in instalments is an admission.
Filing GSTR-3B does not prove tax was paid; no distinction between bona fide and mala fide recipients (Maruti Enterprises; Bhandari Scrap Traders); section 155.
Taxpayer’s case
Receipt was accepted below; the non-toll route exists and drivers avoid tolls to save cost; onward sale is not disputed — goods sold must have been bought and received.
All four conditions of section 16(2) were met when credit was taken. In early 2018 a recipient had no way to see whether a supplier’s GSTR-3B was filed; GSTR-2A began showing that only around April 2019.
The recipient cannot be penalised for the supplier’s internal credit methodology; special knowledge of non-payment rests with the department.
From the Bench
A letter saying a party “does not exist” is a conclusion, not evidence. What was found — was the address there, locked or absent, who was present and what did he say?
The toll-plaza point is circumstantial; alternative routes exist and avoiding tolls is commercially common.
Dealing through brokers is not unusual: In steel and scrap business there are everywhere brokers. It does not by itself impute knowledge of fraud.
An instalment request is at best ambiguous — it may be a decision to settle rather than an admission that the transactions were fictitious.
The notice ran two alternatives — goods not received, and tax not paid. They are distinct and each must be proved on its own footing.
The department must produce all the underlying material relied on in the notice, and report what became of the notices to the four suppliers.
Supplier’s registration cancelled years later — credit on copper-scrap purchases
Appeal by
Taxpayer (four connected appeals)
Period
FY 2018-19 to 2020-21
Heard on
05.11 (2026)
Provisions
s. 16(2), 29(3), 74, 75(7), 155
The matter. A copper-wire manufacturer was denied credit because its suppliers’ registrations were later cancelled — in one case after a one-line notice “in case registration has been obtained by fraud”, in others on the suppliers’ own applications for closure, years after the supplies. The notice (in Gujarati, with a “Draft” watermark) relied only on the cancellation; the appellate order relied on a DGGI survey and a third-party statement that were never in the notice.
Department’s case
The goods were not actually received.
The supplier obtained registration by fraud; its transactions were on paper only.
Taxpayer’s case
Registrations were live when the goods were bought; returns were filed and tax paid. Under section 29(3) the supplier’s liability survives cancellation; nothing permits denying the recipient’s credit for that alone.
No allegation that the supplier did not pay tax.
Section 155 discharged: invoices with vehicle numbers, e-way bills, transporter’s LR, photographs of the truck at unloading, weighbridge slips, driver’s licence and vehicle RC, ledger and bank payments — none rebutted.
No relied-upon documents were supplied except the cancellation notice; statements, panchnama and visit reports asked for were never given.
The orders go beyond the notice (Ballarpur Industries, SC; section 75(7)). Himalaya Communication (HP HC, 2025): credit cannot be refused merely because the supplier’s registration was later cancelled retrospectively.
From the Bench
If a company commits a fraud, that does not make every transaction it enters into false; transactions must be examined one by one. A person confirmed under section 74 once is not a fraud for life.
Which condition of section 16(2) fails? The notice does not say the tax was not paid, and receipt has not been disproved. Was the cancellation because of anything the appellant did?
A one-line conditional notice — “in case registration has been obtained by fraud” — is not even a proper notice to cancel registration.
How does a transaction of 2018 become bogus because the supplier closed its business in 2022, on its own application? What happened after 2022 does not decide a transaction of 2018.
If a passer-by says someone is bogus, the first questions are who he is and how he knows. Who recorded the statement, when, in which enquiry, and what was the maker’s connection with the supplier or the transaction?
The appellant produced the minimum — invoice with e-way bill and vehicle number; the department made no enquiry with the transporter or the vehicle owner.
A supplier is liable for tax on what it sells, wherever it got the goods; a buyer need not explain the seller’s sources. The consequences of the seller’s conduct go with the seller.
Much of the appellate order is not in the notice at all, with no document on record. A Gujarati notice needs an English translation on the portal.
Reversal for non-payment within 180 days — section 74 or 73, and access to the section 128A waiver
Appeal by
Taxpayer
Period
FY 2018-19 and 2019-20
Heard on
01.09 (2026)
Provisions
s. 16(2) second and third provisos, 74, 128A; Rule 37
The matter. An audit found credit not reversed under Rule 37 for suppliers unpaid beyond 180 days; the amounts had been paid before the audit. The notice invoked section 74 (its summary said section 73), and the first appellate authority upheld section 74 — shutting the taxpayer out of the section 128A waiver for both years.
Department’s case
The taxpayer knew GSTR-3B was the only operative return and that Table 7A of the annual return provides for Rule 37 reversals — and disclosed in neither: The appellant says the door is closed, and he is walking through the same door several times.
GSTR-2A is only a facilitator; non-operability of any form is of no avail where returns are self-assessed in GSTR-3B (Supreme Court, 2021).
“Suppression” is defined in the Act itself — non-declaration in a return, or failure to furnish information asked for in writing — and needs no import from other laws.
“Fails” bears one meaning throughout the Act; timing does not cure — the tax stood evaded meanwhile — and later payment does not absolve penalty.
Taxpayer’s case
“Collusion”, present in the excise provision, is absent from GST and cannot be read in.
Neither limb of the definition is met: nothing was asked for in writing, and Rule 37 required addition through GSTR-2, which never came into force — a machinery provision impossible of compliance cannot found non-declaration.
Everything was in the books, and payment had been made before the audit.
Reasons for section 74 must lie within the four corners of the notice (recent Supreme Court decision). With section 74 upheld below, the section 128A route was closed.
From the Bench
Section 74 needs intent to evade. Under the 180-day mechanism the credit is never ineligible — reversal suspends it and payment restores it. If you are eligible for the credit, how can there be an intent to avail ineligible credit?
The department must first elect fraud, wilful misstatement or suppression, and then show the act was done to evade tax — a requirement that governs all three limbs. Suppose I defraud my customer — that is irrelevant. The fraud has to be to evade tax.
“Wilful” attaches only to misstatement; suppression has its own definition; intent governs the whole.
Since the notice was under section 74, the appellant could not have followed the section 128A procedure — the Bench asked whether the benefit can now be granted.
An exporter’s audit — related-party creditors, interest on an excess provisional refund, and section 74 on a GSTR-2A mismatch
Appeal by
Cross-appeals (department and taxpayer)
Period
FY 2017-18 to 2019-20
Heard on
22.09, 05.11 (2026)
Provisions
s. 16(1), 16(2) second proviso, 50, 74, 75(7), 112; Rule 37 and proviso; Schedule I
The matter. A large exporter’s audit raised some twenty points. The first appellate authority (i) set aside the 180-day reversal on supplies from related parties and distinct persons, (ii) dropped interest on an excess provisional refund that had been repaid into the cash ledger, and (iii) confirmed tax on a GSTR-2A mismatch but held section 74 inapplicable. Some vendors had billed the Gujarat unit but reported the supplies against the taxpayer’s registration in another State. The taxpayer also seeks to add two paragraphs to its own appeal.
Department’s case
Rule 37: the proviso deems payment only for Schedule I supplies, which cover related parties only when made in the course or furtherance of business — never verified; remand sought.
Interest: the review authorised interest only for the 61 days between the provisional and final refund orders; in rejoinder the department seeks leave to press interest up to the later DRC-03 debit.
Section 74: credit taken in one State on invoices addressed to a distinct registration elsewhere is a positive misstatement; certificates cover only part; this is not a bare arithmetic mismatch, so the taxpayer’s authorities do not apply.
On the taxpayer’s application: can an appellant that admitted an amount and paid pre-deposit on it change that later, or is it a new appeal?
Taxpayer’s case
The audit took the whole creditors’ balance; for related parties and distinct persons the rule itself deems payment; the inputs went into exported goods. Business nexus was never raised and cannot be raised now; even on remand section 75(7) bars going beyond the notice.
The excess refund was repaid with interest at once; interest runs from receipt of the money to its repayment, not from one order date to the other.
The mismatch was disclosed to the audit with invoice-wise detail and Circular 183 declarations offered; the notice invokes section 74 only for failure to self-assess (Tata Steel; Anand Nishikawa — facts known to both sides are not suppressed).
Rule 32 of the GSTAT Procedure Rules allows an amended appeal to cure a defect; no further pre-deposit or new grounds are involved.
From the Bench
If no payment is payable, does the 180-day condition apply at all? If a supply is not for business, credit fails under section 16(1) itself, whether or not it was paid for. The only ground in the notice was non-payment within 180 days: So first point is over. The department was asked to show even one instance, out of the related-party supplies, that was not for business.
This is not suppression of fact. In fact, it is information readily available to you… Where is suppression? A gross comparison is not identification, and the GSTR-2A condition did not exist before 2022.
Section 74 needs fraud, wilful misstatement or suppression with intent to evade; a failure to self-assess is a section 73 matter. The reason for invoking section 74 must come from the notice. It cannot be created now.
Interest is governed by the jurisdictional High Court (Symphony Ltd.): an amount credited to the cash ledger is paid on the date of credit. The Tribunal will not take another view because other High Courts differ.
The officer filing the appeal cannot exceed the Commissioner’s review authorisation; to raise more, a fresh authorisation and an application are needed.
Adding paragraphs not appealed against may amount to a new appeal on that part, raising limitation; a point left undecided below will be dealt with in the order.
Common-input reversal under Rule 42 — de-oiled rice bran as an exempt by-product
Appeal by
Department
Heard on
08.09, 29.09 (2026)
Provisions
s. 16, 17(2), 74; Rules 42, 43
The matter. A rice-bran-oil maker’s exempt residue, de-oiled rice bran, was treated as an exempt supply calling for proportionate reversal of common credit; section 74 was invoked. The first appellate authority allowed the taxpayer’s appeal.
Department’s case
What matters is supply, not the manufacturing process: one taxable and one exempt supply from common inputs means proportionate reversal.
Intent behind producing the residue is irrelevant once it is supplied.
State of Karnataka v. MK Agro Tech (SC, 2017): the VAT partial-credit provision operated at the stage of sale, not manufacture; “supply” should be read the same way.
Taxpayer’s case
The review appears to have been made beyond the mandatory six months; the appeal raises a new ground never in the notice.
Section 17(2) needs goods used partly for exempt supplies; the entire rice bran is used to make oil, and the residue is inevitable. Rule 42 excludes inputs used exclusively for taxable supplies.
MK Agro Tech is itself a VAT decision on inputs “relatable” to exempt goods; section 17 speaks of goods “used”.
No suppression: the exempt supply is reported in the returns under bills of supply — that is how the department learnt of it.
From the Bench
Like husk from oil seeds, the residue is inevitable and must be disposed of; the economic object is the oil.
Even so, the Bench accepted the department’s principle that once the by-product is supplied, the reversal question must be addressed: the test is supply, not intention, and MK Agro Tech supports reading “supply” like “sale”.
Neither side cited a GST-era decision on the point.
Transitional credit under section 140(6) denied on the section 140(1) return condition
Appeal by
Taxpayer
Period
Appointed day, 1 July 2017
Heard on
07.10 (2026)
Provisions
s. 140(1), 140(6)
The matter. TRAN-1 credit on stock held on 30 June 2017 by a person who had been under composition was denied because returns for the six months before the appointed day — a section 140(1) condition — were not filed.
Department’s case
The returns were not filed, so the credit is inadmissible under section 140(1).
Section 140(6) does not apply on the facts.
Taxpayer’s case
The credit was never taken under section 140(1). It was taken under section 140(6), on eligible stock of a composition taxpayer, so the return condition does not apply.
From the Bench
Facts first: under which sub-section was the credit taken? Then show which condition applies there.
Where is it written that if returns are not filed, credit will not be given? If the credit was not taken under section 140(1), why read that sub-section at all?
The department will be held to the grounds in its notice and cannot travel beyond them.
Refund of accumulated credit cut by reducing “Net ITC” — no section 73/74 notice
Appeal by
Taxpayer
Heard on
01.09, 07.10 (2026)
Provisions
s. 54(3), 73, 74; Rules 89(4), 92(3)
The matter. An export-oriented unit’s refund was partly rejected by deducting, from Net ITC, credit on hotel stays, staff uniforms, garden maintenance, works relating to immovable property and fees paid to the industrial development corporation for letting a building. The refund notice raised only documentary points and stated the inadmissible amount as nil; no notice to deny the credit was ever issued.
Department’s case
The items are not related to manufacturing; the corporation’s charges relate to construction.
The ineligible credit was simply deducted from Net ITC and the balance refunded.
Taxpayer’s case
Without adjudication under section 73 or 74, credit cannot be denied or deducted in refund proceedings — GSTAT, Ernakulam Bench (2026).
The fee is payable under the corporation’s rules to let out an existing building; tax was paid on it; no construction was undertaken.
From the Bench
No notice to deny the credit means the credit stays in the ledger and can be used to pay tax — so how can refund of the same credit be refused?
Refund proceedings are not the forum to deny ITC; a wrongly taken credit needs its own notice, reasons and reply.
The refund notice raised five documentary points and stated nil as inadmissible: how can refund be denied without notice?
How do we find out whether you are right or wrong unless you give the reason?
In GST the notice is the outer boundary: if something is not in the notice, it is not in the proceedings.
On the Ernakulam decision: Correct. Quite well settled.
Erroneous IGST refund under Rule 96(10) — re-credit on repayment
Appeal by
Department
Period
2018 to 2020
Heard on
01.09 (2026)
Provisions
s. 17(5)(i), 74, 75; Rule 96(10); 2022 circular on repayment of erroneous refunds
The matter. Refund of IGST on exports was demanded under Rule 96(10). The first appellate authority dropped the demand for the period before the October 2018 notification, confirmed the rest without penalty, and allowed re-credit to the credit ledger of the amount repaid. The departmental appeal is confined to the re-credit.
Department’s case
Confirming a demand under section 74(1) and finding no element of penalty is inconsistent.
Re-credit was never in issue in the notice or the original order and is the proper officer’s prerogative, not the appellate authority’s.
Tax paid under section 74 is barred as credit by section 17(5)(i); a circular cannot override the statute.
Taxpayer’s case
Rule 96(10) has been omitted without a saving clause, and the Supreme Court has directed that proceedings founded on it be set aside.
The second October 2018 notification is prospective (as the High Court’s rectified order holds), which covers the earlier period.
For the later period the amount was repaid with interest; the 2022 rule and circular give the exporter re-credit on repayment — exports are not to be burdened with tax.
The re-credit ground was taken in the review itself, so it is within the appeal.
From the Bench
Denial of a refund must result in re-credit. Debiting the ledger is a condition of filing the claim and is temporary; it becomes permanent only if the refund is allowed. It is his money — he is to be restored as if he never claimed.
Re-credit is the legal consequence of denial, not a discretionary act of any officer; a demand of erroneous refund is not a demand of tax.
The circular directs re-credit where refund is denied; the department ultimately could not argue against it.
A departmental appeal must reiterate the grounds of the review order; the authorised officer cannot add grounds of his own.
The inconsistency cuts both ways: if section 74 was held inapplicable, the demand itself may be beyond limitation.
IGST refund after Mohit Minerals — retrospective effect and utilised credit
Appeal by
Department
Heard on
08.09 (2026)
Provisions
s. 49, 54
The matter. IGST paid under notifications later struck down in Union of India v. Mohit Minerals was claimed as refund after the credit had been availed and utilised. The first appellate authority allowed the refund.
Department’s case
Mohit Minerals should operate prospectively; completed transactions should not be unsettled.
The IGST credit was availed and, under section 49, compulsorily utilised first; a refund of consumed credit is impermissible unless it is reversed by DRC-03 (SN Tracent, Gujarat HC).
Taxpayer’s case
Judicial decisions are retrospective by default; prospective overruling needs an express declaration by the Supreme Court, and Mohit Minerals contains none.
Courts discover the law as it always was (Constitution Bench; Stock Exchange case); the Gujarat High Court has granted similar refunds.
From the Bench
Judicial decisions are retrospective by default; prospective overruling is a special power the Supreme Court exercises expressly. A notification declared unconstitutional is invalid from its issue, not from the judgment.
Documents already part of the notice are not new evidence; the application to produce them was allowed.
Refund on export of a brand under LUT — must inputs be linked to the zero-rated supply?
Appeal by
Taxpayer
Heard on
29.09 (2026)
Provisions
s. 54(3); Rule 89(4)
The matter. A footwear manufacturer sold its long-used registered brand to a foreign buyer as an export of services under LUT and claimed refund of accumulated ITC. Refund was rejected, and upheld in first appeal, for want of correlation between inputs and the export.
Department’s case
Zero-rating exists so that taxes are not exported; no input was used in selling a trademark.
Excise-era authorities rested on a circular dispensing with correlation; the one GST decision (Delhi HC) proceeds on the footing that correlation is relevant.
Section 54 speaks of inputs “used in making” the zero-rated supply — some nexus is required; selling IP is not the footwear business.
Taxpayer’s case
Neither the Act nor the Rules require one-to-one correlation; the Rule 89(4) formula governs the refund.
The brand was the business for many years; appellate authority decisions hold correlation unnecessary.
From the Bench
Put to the department to answer: the brand has value only because the business is conducted, so every input and service of the business contributed to it.
The intellectual property sold was the brand of the same business.
Case 14 of 24Decided on 29.09.2026 — departmental appeals dismissed
Refunds upheld in first appeal — interest under section 56
Appeal by
Department (batch of 46 appeals)
Heard on
29.09 (2026)
Provisions
s. 56
The matter. Departmental appeals against orders of the first appellate authority allowing refunds.
Order
Appeals dismissed; refunds to be processed and paid with interest.
Interest under section 56 runs from the expiry of 60 days from the date of the original refund application — not from the appellate order — till actual payment. Illustration from the Bench: an application of 22 April 2023 carries interest from 22 June 2023.
Case 15 of 24Decided on 22.10.2026 — interest not payable after deposit
Interest under section 50 on tax already lying in the Electronic Cash Ledger
Appeal by
Taxpayer
Heard on
01.09 (2026)
Provisions
s. 39, 49(1), 49(3), 50; Rule 88B
The matter. In a section 73 adjudication, interest was computed from the due date to the date of the return, ignoring the balance already deposited in the cash ledger. Interest on the net cash component had been paid.
Department’s case
This is a liability determined in adjudication, not self-assessment; the net-cash benefit is confined to belated returns.
A PMT-06 deposit is an advance; payment happens only on debit and set-off under section 49(3). Interest runs in between.
The taxpayer controls the ledger — it can seek refund or use it — and the cash may stand allocated to other periods.
Taxpayer’s case
The Rule 88B proviso operates only from July 2024.
On the jurisdictional High Court’s Division Bench view, money in the cash ledger already belongs to the Government, like advance tax; the later debit is an internal entry.
Interest is compensatory; the Government lost nothing while the money was with it.
From the Bench
The Bench put the jurisdictional High Court’s decisions — including one imposing costs for not following them — to the department: either overcome them or distinguish them on facts. Neither was attempted.
On the Supreme Court authority that interest is compensatory: That goes against you… unless some loss is incurred by you or some gain is made by him, there is no question of compensation. The money was with you.
It is like a savings account. I can withdraw at any time, but the bank still pays me interest until the day I withdraw. It does not work in reverse.
Order
Order pronounced on 22.10.2026: interest is not payable for the period after the tax was deposited in the Electronic Cash Ledger, where it remained as a balance and was later debited against the liability.
Case 16 of 24UpdatedDecided — departmental appeals dismissed (29.09, 07.10 and 04.11.2026)
Assignment of leasehold rights in industrial (GIDC) plots — tax, section 74 penalty and refund
Appeal by
Department (batch)
Heard on
01.09, 22.09, 29.09, 07.10, 04.11 (2026)
Provisions
s. 7, Schedules II and III, 54, 74
The matter. Departmental appeals against orders dropping GST on assignment of leasehold rights in plots allotted by the State industrial development corporation — including one where only the section 74 penalty was in issue (tax and interest paid after investigation began but before the notice) and one where the first appellate authority allowed refund of GST paid on such an assignment.
Department’s case
A review petition is proposed against the Supreme Court’s dismissal of the department’s special leave petitions.
On the penalty matter: payment came only after investigation began and liability was admitted then — a “peculiar case”.
In a later matter the department sought “verification” of whether the facts fall within the High Court decision.
Taxpayer’s case
The question is concluded by the Gujarat High Court (Gujarat Chamber of Commerce and Industry) and the Supreme Court’s dismissal of the SLPs; no review has been filed, listed or stayed.
On penalty: the transaction was in the books throughout; the levy was genuinely disputed and the taxpayer’s belief has since been upheld; at the highest it is a section 73 case.
From the Bench
On the plea of bona fide belief: Your belief is upheld by the High Court as well as the Supreme Court.
Section 74 penalty needs fraud, wilful misstatement or suppression with intent to evade; where the levy was in genuine and general dispute, intent is hard to hold, and payment after investigation began does not by itself supply the mental element.
A proposed review petition is no answer to a concluded question of law.
On “verification”: a GIDC plot was leased and the lease assigned — Then it is covered — what else can it be? A notice issued two years ago presupposes verification.
Order
All departmental appeals on assignment of leasehold rights dismissed; where penalty was proposed, section 74 held not invokable.
An appellate order allowing refund of GST paid on such an assignment was left undisturbed.
E-way bill Part B missing on an inter-branch transfer — section 129 penalty, seven-day limit and Rule 138C
Appeal by
Taxpayer
Period
July 2019 (pre-amendment s. 129)
Heard on
07.10 (2026)
Provisions
s. 129(1), 129(3), 130, 126; Rules 138, 138C
The matter. Imported goods moving from one branch to another (distinct persons) were intercepted with Part B blank; the taxpayer generated Part B about an hour and a half later and the goods moved on under a fresh e-way bill. MOV-09 recorded that no objection had been filed (one had), gave no reasons or calculation, and levied penalty equal to the value of the goods; the later DRC-07 showed penalty equal to the tax. The appellate order contained findings from another case’s facts.
Department’s case
Part B was blank — an admitted breach of Rule 138; generating it after interception does not cure the breach.
E-way bill rules apply to stock transfers as much as to sales; statutory infraction presumes intent, as untracked cargo allows documents to be reused.
Vishal Fab India (MP HC, 2025): non-generation of Part B is substantive, not a minor breach under section 126.
Taxpayer’s case
A branch transfer: tax paid at one end is credit at the other — no revenue effect, no intent; the lapse was promptly cured.
DRC-07 is the order (Panchhi Traders, Gujarat HC: MOV-09 has no statutory backing), and it was issued beyond the seven days in section 129(3).
Intent to evade must first be concluded and recorded before detention (Panchhi Traders); a promptly cured Part B lapse does not justify the action (Gujarat High Court decisions).
No EWB-03 inspection reports were uploaded or supplied; the appellate order is copy-paste and non-speaking.
From the Bench
Of MOV-09: whoever issued it had not read it.
Pre-amendment section 129(1) has no penalty equal to value — that is a section 130 consequence, and section 130 was not invoked. With DRC-07 at the tax amount the penalty point falls away, but the question of which document is the order gets harder.
As compulsory as generating Part B is, so compulsory is following Rule 138C. We cannot say that the fault of only one side will be looked at.
The department must address the Allahabad High Court line and Satyam Shivam Papers (SC): Even if you don’t say, I will have to apply those.
Three points for the department: the seven-day limit if MOV-09 has no legal basis; whether EWB-03/EWB-04 were generated; and how a penalty equal to value can stand at all.
Case 18 of 24Decided on 22.10.2026 — appeal dismissed as infructuous
Seized goods claimed by eleven firms — provisional release and confiscation under section 130
Appeal by
Department
Heard on
22.10 (2026)
Provisions
s. 129, 130
The matter. Goods found at a taxpayer’s premises were disclaimed by it, on statement and affidavit, during investigation. Eleven firms using the same premises proved ownership — owner’s consent letters, insurance taken before the search, bank intimation and stock records. The first appellate authority directed release to them, and the goods were released on bank guarantee and bond.
Department’s case
If the order stands, the adjudicating authority must hear the eleven firms in confiscation proceedings — travelling beyond a notice issued only to the respondent.
Taxpayer’s case
The firms’ evidence, including insurance that predates the search, was produced during investigation; the goods have been released on security, so nothing remains in dispute.
From the Bench
The first appellate authority is not required to uphold the notice: The appellate authority has to uphold the truth, on the evidence before it. That an order goes against the notice is not by itself a ground.
Both the respondent and the firms say the goods are the firms’. Where there is no dispute, the Tribunal will not create one to decide title — and how can a person be made to bear tax on goods it has disclaimed?
Nothing prevents the department from proceeding against the true owners; how it investigates is for it.
Confiscation needs the goods in possession, or the bond under which they were released; one person’s bond cannot be enforced against another. An appeal against release, after release on bond, serves no purpose.
At the stage of release, tax, title and confiscation are not decided.
Unaccounted cash sales from a seized pen drive — section 65B, section 145 and corroboration
Appeal by
Department
Period
Search in 2020
Heard on
29.09, 13.10 (2026)
Provisions
s. 144, 145; Evidence Act ss. 65A, 65B; Customs Act s. 138C
The matter. A ledger of cash sales recovered from a pen drive seized in a search was the basis of a demand. The first appellate authority dropped it for want of a section 65B certificate (other demands, for excess and short stock, were confirmed under section 74 and paid without appeal).
Department’s case
Arjun Panditrao Khotkar: a certificate may be produced at any stage and by the responsible officer; one has been filed by the officer who had custody and operated the computer, with custody transfers in charge reports. Compliance is fact-specific (DRI v. Suresh Kumar & Co. Impex, SC, 2026).
Section 145 of the CGST Act — non obstante and later in time — governs; unlike excise section 36B it lays down no conditions for storage media, and the Evidence Act applies to courts.
Corroboration: the ledger is arithmetically exact; entries match the seized petty-cash book and challans to the rupee — even a discount for broken pieces, which no “enquiry register” would record; unretracted statements admit cash sales without invoices; a buyer’s statement was countersigned by the partner; there is a cash trail.
New material in reply — medical records, sample invoices, a “paid to buy peace” plea — came without leave; documents found at one’s premises must be explained (s. 144; Gopal Krishnaji Ketkar).
Taxpayer’s case
A new case is being built: the buyer’s statement was left out of the notice — the questions referring to it were omitted — and no tax was demanded on that sale.
Cash sales are not denied, the quantum is: no buyer was examined in four years though the buyers are regular customers in its returns.
The pen drive was not connected to any computer; the data could have come from group units; the source is unknown and the challans are unsigned.
A document listed among the relied-upon documents but never made the basis of the allegation cannot found a departmental appeal.
From the Bench
Who held the pen drive, and was the certifying officer the seizing officer? Transfers of custody should be in the certificate.
That buyers were not investigated, and that the pen-drive data is unreliable, are two different arguments, each needing its own reasons. The officers had no time to insert data into a pen drive lying in the premises: Then what is the challenge to that pen drive?
An answer giving reasons for not issuing invoices is not a denial of the sales.
A party that knew of a document is expected to ask for a copy at the outset; a health plea never taken earlier carries little weight.
On the buyer’s statement: This statement may be quite relevant — yet the notice did not discuss it, and no tax was demanded on that very sale; that it fell outside the notice period did not satisfy the Bench.
The matter. Products sold as organic manure, organic fertiliser and organic potash (classified under 3101/3104 at 5%) were proposed under 3808 at 18% on CRCL reports showing nitrogen negative and silent on organic carbon. The first appellate authority held that N, P or K present even in traces satisfies Note 6, relying on a private laboratory report.
Department’s case
Heading 3101 needs animal or vegetable origin; the taxpayer’s own process statements show no chemical treatment, and binders like ball clay and coal powder are inorganic; calcium and sulphur figures show added minerals.
With 3102–3104 excluded, only 3105 remains, and Note 6 needs N, P or K as an essential constituent — presence alone, or traces, empties the test (Karnataka Agro Chemicals, SC).
CRCL, asked to report essential constituents, reported organic carbon where it mattered; its silence means absence. The private laboratory lacked fertiliser accreditation when it tested, on samples the taxpayer drew alone.
The notice’s 3808 reference is a slip in reproducing a circular whose reasoning is 3824; section 160 and the wrong-label principle save it. Section 74 and the extended time limits apply; the cross-objections are late.
Taxpayer’s case
The appeal raises only two grounds — the meaning of “essential” and the laboratory’s approval — not the report’s contents or the ingredients.
Ingredients are organic manures; at least one of N, P, K appears in every CRCL result; organic matter is 25–30% and more.
“Essential” is not a percentage; binders are fillers, not chemicals, and Note 2(c) allows inorganic non-fertilising substances.
3808 was never explained; the cross-objections are within 45 days of notice from the registry.
From the Bench
Even if both classifications are wrong, the Tribunal will not decide a third. The department must establish its own heading, not merely reject Chapter 31.
Under 3101, the chemical used to treat an animal or vegetable fertiliser is an outside substance; it need not be of animal or vegetable origin and will remain in the product.
Nobody treated 3808 as an error below; the authority classified under 3808 while justifying 3824. Had it recognised the error and classified under 3824, it would be different — tricky.
Essentiality may turn on object, not percentage — a little ghee changes a dish if the object is taste. If N, P and K are removed and the product becomes useless, they are essential; buyers, use and advertising may be relevant (tentative).
Proved, disproved and not proved are three different things: a laboratory’s silence on organic carbon does not prove absence.
Accreditation is tested for when the test was done; the real objection to a late sample is whether it represents the goods.
A report relied on below is not new evidence; product-wise ingredient lists may be, and correlation must be shown. Late cross-objections need a condonation application.
Only a summary in DRC-01 — no detailed notice and no DRC-01A
Appeal by
Taxpayer
Period
Before October 2020
Heard on
05.11 (2026)
Provisions
s. 73/74; Rule 142(1), 142(1A)
The matter. The only notice was a two-page summary in DRC-01. For the period, pre-notice intimation in DRC-01A was mandatory, and none was issued.
Department’s case
It is an investigation case and everything is covered in the two pages on the portal.
Taxpayer’s case
If the summary is the whole notice, the department must also accept that DRC-01A was never issued while it was mandatory.
From the Bench
Both sides confirmed that the two pages are the entire notice; whether that is adequate is for the Bench to decide.
Case 22 of 24Arguments heard; order awaited
First appeal rejected because the pre-deposit was paid six months after filing
Appeal by
Taxpayer
Period
FY 2018-19
Heard on
07.10 (2026)
Provisions
s. 107(6), 107(7); Central Excise s. 35F
The matter. The pre-deposit was not debited when the first appeal was filed, owing to a technical error, and was paid from the credit ledger about six months later — while the ledger held more than ten times the amount throughout. The appellate authority heard the appeal years later and rejected it only for the late deposit.
Department’s case
Section 107(6) says no appeal shall be filed without the pre-deposit; such an appeal is no appeal in law; pre-deposit conditions are mandatory (Narayan Chandra Ghosh v. UCO Bank, SC).
Taxpayer’s case
The purpose of pre-deposit — securing the revenue — was met throughout; the lapse was technical and cured; a substantive right of appeal should not fall for it.
Sections 107(6) and (7) link the deposit to the deemed stay of the balance; a decision where waiver was sought does not govern late payment without any waiver.
From the Bench
The dispute is delay, not deposit — the deposit had been made long before the hearing.
A party holding many times the amount unused would forgo interest on it; it is reasonable to infer a mistake. Was it deliberate?
The department’s two possible answers: purpose is irrelevant to a legal requirement — or, if it is a requirement, must it be met on the same day as filing?
Contrast the Central Excise wording, that the Tribunal “shall not entertain” an appeal without deposit.
Section 128A waiver granted directly by the first appellate authority
Appeal by
Department
Period
FY 2019-20
Heard on
22.10 (2026)
Provisions
s. 128A; Rule 164; Forms SPL-01, SPL-02
The matter. Tax for two months of 2019 was paid late without interest. Interest and penalty were confirmed; the first appellate authority allowed the appeal, without going into the merits, by extending the section 128A waiver.
Department’s case
Only the proper officer can grant the waiver, on an application in SPL-01/SPL-02 under Rule 164 after scrutiny; the appellate authority had no such power.
Taxpayer’s case
The appellate order came in the taxpayer’s absence; it was unaware of the scheme; tax having been paid, it is entitled to the waiver.
From the Bench
The taxpayer knew of the original order during the application window and could have withdrawn its appeal and applied.
The department’s case is one of procedure — that the proper officer should have decided — and the Bench asked whether there was anything on merits.
Case 24 of 24Decided — appeals dismissed (08.09 and 29.09.2026)
Low-value departmental appeals — the CBIC litigation policy
Appeal by
Department
Heard on
08.09, 29.09, 22.10 (2026)
Provisions
s. 112; Circular 207/1/2024-GST
The matter. Departmental appeals below the Rs. 20 lakh limit for the Tribunal — in one, only a penalty of about Rs. 20,000 survived because the tax had already been recovered.
From the Bench
Let us not fight for Rs. 20,000. The carve-out for questions of law cannot be read so widely that the threshold becomes meaningless; there must be substance.
The Tribunal may call on the department to show maintainability under the policy on its own, before the respondent objects.
Order
A penalty-only appeal was dismissed in limine for breach of the litigation policy, without comment on merits.
An appeal below Rs. 20 lakh, outside the paragraph 4 exclusions, was dismissed as not maintainable; the questions raised were left open.
Compiled by CA Mehul Joshi from contemporaneous notes of open-court hearings before the GST Appellate Tribunal, Surat Bench, and updated as hearings continue.
Anonymised. Names of parties, officers and representatives, appeal numbers, and the identity of suppliers, customers and brands are omitted; figures are left out or rounded.
Read with care. Observations from the Bench are made in the course of argument; they are not judgments, bind no one and may not reflect the final order. Submissions are recorded as made, not endorsed. This is not a certified record of the Tribunal and not legal advice.
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